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Introduction
In Tasmanian terms, the green political agenda founded in 1972 by the 
United Tasmania Group was a radical attempt to construct a new, value 
based, transformative politics; not only in natural resource management, 
but also in technology, work, society, institutional design and state devel-
opment.1 The Labor Party failed to incorporate this emergent agenda and 
politics, and was subsequently the hardest hit electorally by the political 
greening that followed. Following the Green split off from its support base, 
Labor was unable to form majority government from 1977 until 1998 
and only then following parliamentary reform. Despite being the first 
to go into minority government with Green support, and despite failed 
internal efforts to ‘green’ the Labor Party that have persisted for years, it 
has been Labor that has most felt an adverse electoral impact from the 
Greens. Whilst Labor has had the most to gain in electoral terms from 
reintegrating the green vote, it has instead, it is argued here, resisted green 
policy agendas, destabilised governing arrangements with green partners, 
and achieved parliamentary reform aimed at reducing Green parliamentary 
representation. This resistance by mainstream Labor helped achieve the 
failure of the Green supported Labor minority government in 19922, and 
encouraged the frustrated abandonment of the Green supported Liberal 
minority government in 1998.3
The minority government Labor formed in an Accord with the Greens 
(1989-92) was viewed by many within the Labor Party as a chance to 
reintegrate its aberrant green rump back into its electoral base.4 But whilst 
1 United Tasmania Group, ‘The New Ethic’, in Cassandra Pybus and Richard Flanagan 
(eds), The Rest of the World is Watching: Tasmania and the Greens, Sydney, 1990, pp 34-6.
2 PR Hay and R Eckersley, ‘Tasmania’s Labor-Green Accord 1989-91: Lessons from 
Lilliput’ Environmental Politics, vol 2, no 1, Spring, 1993, pp 88-93.
3 TJ McCall, ‘Political Chronicles – Tasmania: July to December 1997’, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, vol 44, no 2, 1998a, pp 298-308.
4 PR Hay, ‘Green Politics “in the system”’, in J Pakulski and S Crook (eds), Ebbing of the 
Green Tide? Environmentalism, Public Opinion and the Media in Australia, Occasional Paper 
Series, no 5, School of Sociology and Social Work, University of Tasmania, Hobart, 1998, 
pp 103-25.
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accepting Green support to govern, Labor undermined any reintegration 
strategy by failing to consider policy reforms implicit in the green agenda, 
crucially in terms of state development. In spite of initiating many less 
contentious, yet worthwhile, environmental administrative reforms, the 
Accord was inevitably acrimonious and short-lived.5 Labor vowed it would 
never govern in minority with the Greens again, but would woo itself back 
into majority government, even if over the very long term.6 However it 
eventually abandoned its wooing strategy to achieve its ambition more 
mechanistically. In 1998, Labor gained Liberal support to amend the 
Hare-Clark electoral system used to elect the Lower House of Assembly 
by raising the electoral quota with the intent of ‘minimising uncertainty’, 
a widely recognised euphemism for reducing Green parliamentary repre-
sentation.7 This parliamentary reform offered Labor an expedient, if less 
than democratic, means back to majority power and has frustrated the 
future hopes of many for Labor and the Greens to govern in alliance or 
coalition.8
Following the collapse of the Accord, there was a short-lived return 
to majority government. The Groom Liberal Government (1992-96) 
was elected in a backlash against the minority experience. Because this 
government failed to impress the electorate, minority government loomed 
again in 1996. Labor was in no position to return to majority power, having 
pursued political and policy agendas during the Accord that had achieved 
widespread alienation on many fronts, and having hit electoral rock bottom 
as a consequence. After the Accord and the Groom government experiences, 
and with the Greens now a viable political alternative, the electorate again 
drifted away from the major parties in the lead up to the 1996 election. In 
a legitimate bid to force drifting votes back into conventional party stables, 
the Labor and Liberal major parties professed ‘no minority government 
deals’ in a bid to distance themselves from the Greens. By contrast the 
Greens were preparing to govern with either party by setting out three 
5 Hay and Eckersley, ‘Tasmania’s Labor-Green Accord’, pp 88-93.
6 M Field, ‘Progressive Government in Minority: a Contradiction in Terms’, Legislative 
Studies, vol 11, no 2, Autumn, 1997, pp 62-7.
7 This is not how Labor argued for parliamentary reform. Reducing parliamentary 
expenditure to pay for the 40 per cent pay rise for politicians was the commonly expressed 
motivation for reform, with some concern also expressed about the role of the Legislative 
Council, which is yet to be addressed.
8 This was achieved by amending the Tasmanian Constitution Act. The Parliamentary 
Reform Bill 1998 (31/1998) passed by the Legislative Council on 23 July 1998. Although 
reference to the people for such a change is not required, it had been intended by Premier 
Rundle as a measure of good faith; see R Herr, ‘State Democracy to be Lynched by Reforms’, 
Advocate, 22 July 1998, p 11; M Mackerras, ‘A More Solid Reflection of Popular Preferences’, 
The Australian, 14 July 1998, p 13.
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options for sharing power.9 As every poll had predicted, and despite a drop 
in the Green vote, neither major party received sufficient support in 1996 
to govern in its own right. The Labor Party refused to cooperate with the 
Greens. As the party with the highest vote, the Liberals eventually agreed to 
form a minority government with Green support under a new leader, Tony 
Rundle, who agreed with the Greens’ request to explore consensus-based 
mechanisms of improving government.10 
This paper draws upon the themes and traditions in Tasmanian politics 
in an attempt to explain the acrimony between Labor and the Greens, 
and considers how it is that the Liberals and Greens found themselves 
more comfortable political bedfellows between 1996-98 than Labor 
and the Greens did during the Accord. It argues that the ‘coming of the 
Greens’ has injected an unwelcome radicalism and political idealism into 
a state politics that had traditionally been defined by persona, place and 
conservative pragmatism. It also shows how the themes and traditions in 
Tasmanian politics before 1972, that had served to consolidate the Labor 
Party’s domination over power, were so disrupted by the advent of green 
politics. Indeed, it argues that these have become the themes and traditions 
of a ‘new conservatism’ to which Labor appealed in 1998 as part of its 
strategy of winning back majority government, if not to reassert once back 
in office. The paper briefly considers both Green minority governments 
(1989-92; 1996-98), and the tensions during the 1996-98 Liberal-Green 
minority government that culminated in bipartisan parliamentary reform 
to regain majority power. It also finds Labor’s struggle to return to political 
dominance and power in its own right to be as a key factor that worked 
against the success of Green minority government. For reasons of scope 
only, the paper is focused on the House of Assembly, rather than on the 
Tasmanian Legislative Council, arguably still one of Australia’s most 
powerful upper houses.11
Persona, Place & Conservative Pragmatism: Before 1972
In the most decentralised state in Australia, region and personality have 
long inspired a ‘politics of brokerage’ that has eclipsed doctrinal cleavages, 
leaving little policy difference between the major parties.12 Before the 
9 M Lester, ‘Milne Power Game: Greens Set Out Formula for Minority Government in 
a Hung Parliament’, Mercury, 20 February 1996, pp 1-2.
10 Lester, ‘Milne Power Game’, p 1.
11 This difficult choice is based on the Greens’ presence only in the lower House of 
Assembly.
12 GC Sharman, ‘The Politics of Brokerage’, Current Affairs Bulletin, vol 53, 1977, p 22.
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coming of the Greens, rather than being intellectually or ideologically 
inspired, politics in the small island state has been portrayed as simply 
about interests.13 The Hare-Clark electoral system of proportional represen-
tation has served to underline this interest-based politics in such a localised 
fashion that candidates often turn upon their own party’s policies.14 Whilst 
the election of independents has been commonplace, with some of these 
holding the balance of power, the party system pattern in Tasmania at least 
since 1945 has tended to be characterized as dominant (Labor)/subordinate 
(Liberals).15 Prior to 1972, Tasmania’s major parties were considered 
‘moderate and conservative’, and minor parties did not fair as well as 
independents, with no third party clearly emerging.16 Independents held 
the balance of power after the 1934 election, enabling Labor under Albert 
Ogilvie to govern; keeping Labor under Robert Cosgrove in power after 
the 1948 election; and supporting Labor under Eric Reece in the 1950s.17 
Each of these iconic Labor Premiers, much revered historically by their own 
party and state, did not therefore always govern in majority.
Whilst it is true to say that green politics injected previously unknown 
ideological stakes into political contestation in Tasmania, it is untrue to say 
that they disrupted majority government, given this history of independent 
representation. What they have done, however, is to provide a viable third 
party option, impact adversely upon the Labor vote, and increase the 
likelihood of minority government. By accommodating independents, 
Labor had been able to dominate state politics, holding office for most of the 
years 1934-1982 (with the exception of 1969-72) until the election of the 
Liberals in 1982.18 However, Labor was dominant (in terms of seats won) 
only between 1934-1950; between 1976-79 for example Labor only held 
13 R Chapman, G Smith, J Warden and B Davis, ‘Tasmania’, in B. Galligan (ed) , 
Australian State Politics, Melbourne, 1986, p 117; WA Townsley, The Government of 
Tasmania, St Lucia, 1976, p 41.
14 M Mackerras, ‘The Operation and Significance of the Hare-Clark System’, in M 
Haward and J Warden (eds.), An Australian Democrat: The Life, Work, and Consequences of 
Andrew Inglis Clark Hobart, 1995, pp 163-80.
15 C Sharman, G Smith and J Moon, ‘The Party System and Change of Regime: The 
Structure of Partisan Choice in Tasmania and Western Australia’, Australian Journal of 
Political Science, vol 26, no 3, November 1991, p 417.
16 Townsley, The Government of Tasmania, p 62.
17 M Haward and G Smith, ‘The 1989 Tasmanian Election: the Green Independents 
Consolidate’, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol 2, no 5, 1990, pp 196-217; WA 
Townsley, ‘Independents and the Balance of Power in the Tasmanian House of Assembly’, 
Edgeways, Summer 1988, p 11. Majorities were difficult to achieve in the even numbered 
House of Assembly prior to 1959.
18 Sharman et al, ‘The Party System and Change of Regime’, p 411. These authors find 
the new Liberal Gray government much like the previous one in terms of dominance and of 
policy results.
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power by a one-seat majority. Furthermore, as noted above, Labor relied 
upon independents to break into and twice to hold onto power throughout 
its long period of dominance. Indeed, the non-Labor block was only one 
seat behind Labor in 1934; whilst the Liberal party was only one seat 
behind in the periods 1950-55, 1959-64 and 1976-79, and held equal seats 
on a lesser percentage of votes between 1956-59.19 Rather than disrupting 
majority government in Tasmania, then, it appears that the Greens recast 
delicately balanced electoral patterns sufficient to expose what had histori-
cally been a slender Labor lead in the relatively small House of Assembly.
Before the advent of the Greens, political contestation in Tasmania was 
certainly distinguished by its lack of doctrinal disputes and theorising;20 
it was low key and dispassionate, kicking into gear only for the pragmatic 
purposes of electioneering.21 Parliamentary members have always been 
conscious of the need, in Hare-Clark’s multi-member constituencies, to 
campaign against the members of their own party as much as against their 
political opponents to retain their seats. Hence the enduring significance 
of personality, region and brokerage that others have identified as critical 
to the parochial deal making that has constituted true political practice in 
Tasmania.22 In essence, the ‘politics of brokerage’ has involved the identifi-
cation and satisfaction of regional needs often by local figures who rise to 
political prominence and who may then be electorally rewarded for their 
efforts. Political doctrine and policy platforms have only been relevant 
where these complement rather than detract from such efforts. Politics in 
general has therefore been both accommodationist of independents, who 
did not constitute the party political force that the Greens were to, and 
responsive to locality. Locality was a concept that the Greens were also to 
recast in a cleaner, greener, more self-sufficient light.
In the absence of political ideology, it has been a preoccupation with 
the development and survival of its peripheral island economy that has 
always driven Tasmanian politics, more so than any defining political 
philosophies or idealism. There has historically been, and is still, little 
difference in approach to development between the major political parties, 
19 Townsley, ‘Independents and the Balance of Power’, p 11; see also election results 
available at http://www.parliament.tas.gov.au/tpl/elections/ElectionInfo.htm. Note also 
that only 54 per cent of governments were majorities between 1909-96, S Bennett, ‘The 
Reduction in the Size of the Tasmanian Parliament’, Research Note 2 1998-99, Parliament 
of Australia, Parliamentary Library, Canberra.
20 There was at least one exception. Social credit ideology did help Labor to power in the 
Depression.
21 R Herr, ‘Hare-Clark: the Electoral Legacy’, in Haward and Warden, An Australian 
Democrat, p 187; Townsley, The Government of Tasmania, pp 64-66.
22 Sharman, ‘The Politics of Brokerage’, pp 15-23.
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albeit that Labor has more typically responded to trade union concerns, on 
hydroindustrialisation and forestry in particular, and the Liberals to their 
business constituency. The themes that have resonated instead of political 
ideology, and that have been given expression in the practice of hydroin-
dustrialisation from the 1930s,23 include the island survival theme; the state 
development theme; the theme of underwriting industry; the leadership 
theme; and the theme of consolidating power. Together these themes have 
defined a distinctly Tasmanian politics of persona, place and conservative 
pragmatism that again was to be disrupted, recast and reinterpreted by 
the emergence of the Greens.24 Tasmania is Australia’s only island state, its 
most peripheral state, the state most recognised for the quality of its natural 
environment, and home to the world’s first Green party.
The island survival theme in particular underpins state politics. It is 
a theme riddled with contradictions whereby ‘island’ is both obstacle, in 
terms of economic self-reliance, and opportunity, in terms of a unique 
niche economy. The problems with the island’s peripheral, natural 
resource based economy continue to be well documented, perhaps 
never more succinctly than by the Callaghan inquiry into the structure 
of industry and employment in Tasmania.25 The Callaghan fix to 
Tasmania’s physical and economic remoteness, and its fatal dependence 
upon external markets, was to replace imports, to foster local markets 
and control, and, critically, to develop small business. The traditional 
state development fix of underwriting industry by offering inducements 
to large scale external businesses to set up branch operations in the state, 
championed on the whole by iconic Labor Premiers, only exacerbated 
its vulnerability.26 Nevertheless it was certainly Labor that emerged as 
the natural party of government by best weaving together the themes 
of island economy, state development and strong leadership into a 
hydro-industrial industry attraction strategy. The support of unions, big 
business, the hydro-bureaucracy, and even Labor’s political opponents, 
for this strategy, ensured that Labor consolidated its grip upon political 
power. The emergence of green politics was to be a disruption by 
breaking Labor’s political dominance, introducing greener development 
23 PR Hay, ‘Will the “Tasmanian Disease” Spread to the Mainland? The Politics of Land 
Use Conflict’, Current Affairs Bulletin, vol 64, no 3, 1987, pp 4-12.
24 K Crowley, ‘The Rise and Rise of the Tasmanian Greens: The State Election 2002’, 
Environmental Politics, vol 12, no 1, 2003, p 234.
25 B Callaghan, Inquiry into the Structure of Industry & the Employment Situation in 
Tasmania, Canberra, 1977. Recent reports include P Nixon, The Nixon Report: Tasmania 
into the 21st Century, Hobart, 1997, and Government of Tasmania, Directions for Information 
Technology and Advanced Telecommunications, Hobart, 1997.
26 Hay, ‘Will the “Tasmanian Disease” Spread?’, pp 4-12.
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choices, and offering starker policy alternatives that clearly distinguished 
the Greens from the major parties.
The Coming of the Greens: After 1972
The emergence of an environmental political force in Tasmania, from the 
fertile ground of its long term and historically significant conservation 
movement, has been a severe disruption to the states’ political tradition on 
several fronts. It is well documented that environmental politics was born 
in Tasmania out of the frustration of conservationists with the bipartisan 
plan to flood the Lake Pedder, the incomparable, exquisite jewel in the 
heart of the state’s South West wilderness.27 The United Tasmanian Group 
(UTG), the world’s very first green party, was founded in a last ditch conser-
vationist bid to save Lake Pedder by contesting the 1972 state election; 
ironically finding itself campaigning against state bureaucracy, namely the 
Hydro-Electric Commission (HEC). After the founding of the UTG, the 
idealistic conservationists of the 1970s hardened into the political realists 
of the 1980s, who willingly played traditional politics in an effort to avert 
any further ecological tragedies. The political skill of these environmental-
ists, and the broadening of their political campaigns, ensured their steady 
entry into the House of Assembly as green independents throughout the 
1980s, culminating in the realisation of the UTG’s dream of achieving the 
balance of power by supporting the minority Labor government in 1989 
and subsequently forming the Tasmanian Greens. 28
Even so, Tasmania’s early conservationists were not political activists in 
the contemporary sense, as their failure to save Lake Pedder attests; neither 
was public policy in the 1970s as readily influenced by public debate. Had 
Lake Pedder survived in its natural state, it would feature today as one of 
Australia’s most significant natural icons.29 Nevertheless, once the bipartisan 
state development agenda threatened the South West wilderness, and given 
the representative capacity of the Hare-Clark electoral system, the political 
path beckoned. When conservationists and environmentalists entered 
state politics, they brought with them notions of place, development, 
industry, leadership and political power that still defy traditional political 
norms. Whilst the major parties have long advocated the transformation of 
Tasmania’s environment in order to realise its value, conservationists have 
27 Pybus and Flanagan, The Rest of the World is Watching; Haward and G Smith, ‘The 
1989 Tasmanian Election’, pp 196-217.
28 Lester, ‘Milne Power Game’, p 1; Hay and Eckersley, ‘Tasmania’s Labor-Green Accord', 
pp 88-93; D Johnson, Lake Pedder: Why a National Park Must Be Saved, Adelaide, 1972.
29 PR Hay, Commentary made on the film Lake Pedder Lindfield, 1997.
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advocated an economy built upon the preservation of the island’s natural 
state. Green politicians today still receive mixed support at best from the 
major parties in their attempts to protect natural areas from exploitation.30 
Similarly, subsidies to large resource exploiting industries such as forestry are 
not welcomed by conservationists, environmentalists or green politicians, 
who see state funds as better deployed in fostering clean, green industries. 
Green politicians have also brought previously unknown notions of political 
transparency and bureaucratic accountability to Tasmanian politics, such 
as the introduction of freedom of information legislation, much as the 
environmental movement has done in the global context.31
So much for the green disruption to bipartisan political themes, 
tradition and development consensus in Tasmania. Perhaps more lethal 
for the long term viability of the parliamentary Greens in particular was 
their disruption to Labor’s traditional electoral support base. As we saw 
above, political folklore has cast the Labor Party as electorally dominant in 
Tasmania for much of this last century for its ability to win government, 
without recognising the slender character of this dominance of government 
in fact. Indeed a great part of the Labor skill of retaining power for all of 
this time was the ability of its iconic leaders literally to cobble together 
vital partnerships by indulging the agendas of various independents and at 
times localities in order to govern.32 Certainly the pressures involved were 
lessened, though not eliminated, with the increase in House of Assembly 
members from 30 to 35 in 1959 for the purposes of achieving greater 
stability.33 However, in the character of Tasmanian politics, these partner-
ships came largely without ideological baggage, the independent GS 
Carruthers notwithstanding (who initially helped Ogilvie to power in 1934 
in return for his support for social credit theory).34 However, the green 
agenda is more ideologically driven than major party politics, however 
pragmatically pursued, to the extent of considerably straining relations 
with partners in government.
After the Australian Democrats gained a foothold in the House of 
Assembly in 1980, they and their Green independent successors (Bob 
30 Hay, ‘Will the “Tasmanian Disease” Spread?’, pp 4-12.
31 RC Paehlke, ‘Democracy & Environmentalism: Opening a Door to the Administrative 
State’, in RC Paehlke and D Torgerson (eds), Managing Leviathan: Environmental Politics 
and the Administrative State, Peterborough, 1990, pp 35-58.
32 WA Townsley, Tasmania: From Colony to Statehood, Hobart, 1991; WA Townsley, 
Tasmania: Microcosm of Federation or Vassal State, 1945-83, Hobart, 1994.
33 T Newman, Hare-Clark in Tasmania: Representation of all Opinions, Hobart, 1992, p 
92.
34 Townsley, ‘Independents and the Balance of Power in the Tasmanian House of 
Assembly’, p 11.
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Brown elected 1982; Gerry Bates 1986; and Christine Milne, Di Hollister 
and Lance Armstrong, 1989) did battle primarily with Labor over conser-
vation issues. 35 It was Labor’s electoral stakes that initially suffered after the 
coming of the Greens. There followed the loss of public faith in Labor’s 
conservationist credentials after Lake Pedder’s inundation at the hands of 
Labor Premier ‘Electric’ Eric Reece; the desertion of party faithful over its 
equivocal handling of the Franklin dam dispute in the early 1980s; and the 
forthright manner in which the Liberal Opposition, led by Robyn Gray, 
assumed the mantle of hydro-developer and protector of state’s rights in 
the face of federal concern over the Franklin dam proposal.36 The resultant 
schism within both Labor and its support base post 1982 threatened to 
inflict fundamental electoral damage, with the significant scattering of 
Labor’s constituency to both the left (i.e. to the Greens) and right (i.e. the 
Liberals) indicating contradictory paths towards its rebuilding. Throughout 
the 1980s, the votes Labor lost to the Liberals slipped further from its 
grasp as Premier Robin Gray successfully modelled himself in the strident, 
traditional Labor leadership style of Ogilvie, Cosgrove and Reece.
Meanwhile, the broadening of green political concerns to include urban 
environmental and agricultural issues, democratised policy process, political 
transparency and ‘clean green’ industrial development further threatened 
Labor. The departure of Norm Sanders left the Australian Democrats a spent 
force in Tasmania; and Bob Brown inherited the green vote on a recount. 
This vote strengthened and diversified with the 1986 election of Dr Gerry 
Bates, an academic and popular environmental lawyer, who carved out a 
rural-residential support base in the electorate of Franklin following his 
advocacy on behalf of residents opposed to the Electrona silicon smelter. 
Christine Milne, Di Hollister and Lance Armstrong joined their Green 
parliamentary colleagues in 1989, achieving electoral prominence via the 
statewide protest against the proposed billion dollar Wesley Vale pulp 
mill.37 Despite Robin Gray’s conservative capture of much of its support 
base, Labor has justifiably always blamed conservationists in general, and 
their tactical foray into state politics in particular, for its own fall from 
political grace from the 1980s. Between 1982-1992, while Greens were 
steadily taking more seats in the House, Labor’s share of primary votes cast 
at state elections was plummeting from its new low of 35.1 per cent (1986) 
35 D Lowe, The Price of Power: the Politics behind the Tasmanian Dams Case, South 
Melbourne, 1984, p 108.
36 B Davis, ‘The Struggle for South West Tasmania’, in R Scott (ed), Interest Groups & 
Public Policy Melbourne, 1980, pp 152-169; Lowe, The Price of Power.
37 Hay and Eckersley, ‘Tasmania's Labor-Green Accord’, p 88; Hay, ‘Green Politics’, pp 
103-25.
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to its rock bottom of 28.9 per cent (1992) following the collapse of the 
Field Labor minority government.
Against Green Minority Government?
The Labor-Green Parliamentary Accord, 1989-92
Given the tensions between Labor and the Greens on conservation and 
state development, the circumstances in which the Labor-Green Parlia-
mentary Accord had been struck in 1989 were not auspicious for Labor-
environmental relations. While the Greens were flush from the electoral 
success of five of their members, and from their thwarting of the Wesley 
Vale pulp mill, Labor had fallen from 1986 to another unprecedented 
low of 34.7 per cent in 1989. Hay argues that Labor saw the signing of 
the Accord, and the significant conservation concessions that it formally 
gave to the Greens, as its final dealings with them before settling down 
to attempt to govern alone.38 He argues that the Greens took some time 
to realise this.39 The Greens had hoped to partner a shift to progressive 
government; to pursue green, social justice and state development reforms; 
and to see power return from the executive to the floor of parliament. In 
more pragmatic terms, the Greens used the Accord agreement to achieve 
directly as minority government supporters what they had been unable 
to achieve as a collection of independents in opposition. Beyond this, the 
political potential of the Greens was thwarted before it began, but Labor’s 
own policy agenda was also to fall prey to budgetary influences as the extent 
of state debt became clear. The result was unexpected ‘scorched earth’ 
budgetary policy that the Accord bound the Greens into supporting, and 
that saw massive demonstrations and disaffection from even Labor’s own 
dwindling trade union based heartland.40 This was most particularly the 
case with public sector unions such as the Tasmanian Teachers Federation, 
the Health Services Union of Australia, the Police Association of Tasmania 
and the Tasmanian Public Service Association.41
In fact, in its short period in government, and from its lowest-ever 
electoral support base, the Labor minority government achieved a 
widespread alienation of key constituents that guaranteed its poor showing 
at the post Accord poll. These included those traditionalists who had 
38 Hay, ‘Green Politics’, pp 103-25.
39 Hay and Eckersley, ‘Tasmania's Labor-Green Accord’, p 88-93; M Haward and P 
Lamour (eds), The Tasmanian Parliamentary Accord and Public Policy 1989 – 1992: Accom-
modating the New Politics?, Canberra, 1993.
40 A Fisher, ‘Alarm Bells in Jingle Free Election’, The Bulletin, 21 January 1992, p 19.
41 RJ Lindsay, ‘Industrial Relations and the Accord’, in Haward and Lamour, The 
Tasmanian Parliamentary Accord, pp 196-205.
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felt betrayed by Labor forging an alliance with ‘greenies’; those environ-
mentalists who realised that Labor had spurned the spirit of the Accord 
before the ink had dried upon it; those public sector employees, including 
many hard core unionists, who were angered over the loss of their jobs; 
and all those voters who felt betrayed by the government’s retreat from its 
policy promises given in the lead up to the 1989 election. After only thirty 
months, the Greens themselves withdrew their support for the minority 
government having been outmanoeuvred by their Accord partners for 
much of this time. The initial break in the relationship came in October 
1990 when Labor raised the wood-chip export quota above the level of 
2.889 million tonnes per year, thus breaching a key Accord agreement. 
The Greens maintained confidence in the government until the end of 
1991 when they withdrew confidence, again over forest policy.42 With 
Labor planning resource security legislation for the forest industry that was 
blocked by the Greens, there was nowhere left for the Labor government to 
go at the 1992 election, as Pybus rightly predicted, but down.43
The failure of the Green-Labor Accord represented the abject failure of 
Labor’s ‘reintegration of the aberrant green vote’ strategy and the efforts 
of its own environmental constituency to green the party from within. In 
the wake of this, it seemed inconceivable that Labor would ever reinvent 
itself as environmentally progressive and aware; able to envision a clean, 
green, clever Tasmania; and appreciative of the intrinsic value of Tasmania’s 
natural capital. Despite the efforts of some party members, this role remains 
an anathema to the utilitarian party of industrial and natural resource 
development that built its political stronghold on a policy of hydroindustri-
alisation that destroyed Tasmanian wilderness. At the 1992 election, Labor’s 
support hit rock bottom. The Greens also suffered losses, yet retained 
their five seats. The Accord, as it had played out, with the accusations of 
brinkmanship and dirty tricks from both sides, had not worked for either 
partner. But it was Labor that had its members and electoral candidates 
sign a pledge of no more minority government with the Greens. If Labor 
had hoped that the green vote would be short lived, for example as ‘socio-
economic’ orientation eclipsed the ‘quality of life’ environmental concerns 
of the voters, it was mistaken. After the Accord, Labor burnt its bridges 
with the Greens, dedicating itself to recapturing majority power, and left 
it to the Liberals to form the next Green supported majority government, 
rightly reckoning that this would eventually be to its own advantage.44
42 Haward and Lamour, The Tasmanian Parliamentary Accord.
43 C Pybus, ‘For Napoleon, there’s nowhere to go but down’, Australian Society, vol 10, no 
11, November 1991, pp 20-1.
44 Field, ‘Progressive Government in Minority’, pp 62-7. 
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The Green Liberal Government Alliance, 1996-98
Although not natural allies of the Greens, the Liberals did not have the same 
historical, electoral or personal obstacles to working with them as did Labor, 
Premier Gray’s passion for the Franklin dam, the Wesley Vale pulp mill 
and for fast tracking anti-environmental decision making notwithstanding. 
Furthermore, the short-lived Bethune Liberal government, 1969-72, had 
been the most environmentally progressive in Tasmania’s history to date, 
legislating state environmental controls and national parks administration 
into existence.45 Similarly, after a period of strident anti-environmentalism, 
even the Gray government managed to achieve a degree of light green 
ecological self-reinvention. This was achieved largely through the efforts of 
Liberal Environment Minister Peter Hodgman to achieve un-contentious 
environmental improvements (i.e. less waste; and cleaner air and rivers). 
His brother, Liberal Michael Hodgman, had been one of the few Tasmanian 
politicians to publicly question Labor’s plans to flood Lake Pedder, and to 
express regret at its loss. Liberal majority government was returned at the 
1992 election, and the Groom Liberal Government persisted with many 
of the Accord’s environmental reforms from 1992-1996. However, there is 
no doubt that the most obvious obstacle to Liberal-Green relations at this 
time was deposed Premier Robin Gray, even though, as Primary Industry 
Minister in Groom’s government, he suggested that we are all green now.
After the 1996 election, neither major party had the numbers to govern. 
The Liberals and Labor returned 41 per cent and 40 per cent respectively, 
and the Greens returned 11 per cent, again ensuring that they would hold 
the balance of power, as had been predicted.46 Labor was in no position to 
offer to enter into another Accord with the Greens, and as the major party 
with the lesser vote, it had no obligation to either. Labor had campaigned 
hard on ‘No Deals with the Greens’ and had benefited electorally from 
this and the public’s dissatisfaction with the Groom government—its 
40 per cent pay rise for politicians in particular. Labor was also happy 
to see a Liberal-Green partnership struck, knowing that it would be the 
sole beneficiary in the wake of its inevitable demise, and guaranteed to 
keep the Liberal government in power until it could hand down its first 
budget. Despite the misgivings of their business constituency, the Liberals 
eased into an alliance, rather than a formal Accord, with the Greens. As 
Herr points out, the Liberals had already been in government, and as 
the major party with the highest vote were unable to refuse to govern on 
45 Lowe, The Price of Power; Haward and Lamour, The Tasmanian Parliamentary Accord.
46 K Crowley, ‘The Tasmanian State Election 1996: Green Power and Hung Parliaments’, 
Environmental Politics, vol 5, no 3, 1996, pp 530-535.
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constitutional grounds, making the Liberal-Green partnership inevitable.47 
Most crucially, the change in both Liberal and Green leadership, to Tony 
Rundle and Christine Milne respectively, also considerably eased negotia-
tions, Rundle proving more accommodationist than Groom, and Milne 
espousing a new consultative politics that departed from Bob Brown’s hard 
nosed adversarialism.
Although the Greens managed to get ‘clean-green’ principles into 
Rundle’s Directions policy agenda, many of the early gains of the Liberal-
Green alliance were process related, or to do with social reform, and left 
the Greens struggling to make the environmental difference, on forestry 
for instance, that their supporters expected. The Greens were absolutely 
critical to achieving gun law reform, gay law reform, an apology to the 
Tasmanian Aboriginal community’s stolen children, the disaggrega-
tion of the monolithic HEC and so forth. Many such initiatives were 
negotiated behind closed doors with no credit attributed, in keeping 
with the nature of this ‘alliance’ in power. The Greens achieved televised 
Parliament; amended and modernised Standing Orders (in particular to 
both achieve gender neutrality in language and to introduce decorum 
into the debate of both Houses); and an all-party forum to canvass reform 
issues and legislative initiatives.48 The Liberal Speaker of the Lower House 
of Assembly also praised the accountability, efficiency and accelerated 
reformist style of the Rundle minority government. It makes for good 
Parliament, he argued, when there is little filibustering, no repeated 
quorum calls, no late night sittings, no use of the gag, mutually agreed 
adjournments, and institutionalised facilitation of private members’ 
bills.49 Nevertheless, the tensions that would sink this government were 
building.50
The Parliamentary ‘Reform’ Agenda
Parliamentary reform has long been a euphemism for reducing parliamen-
tary numbers in Tasmania, and more recently for ridding the House of the 
Greens. Contemporary efforts to downsize Tasmania’s House of Assembly 
47 RA Herr, ‘Reducing Parliament and Minority Government in Tasmania: Strange 
Bedfellows Make Politics - Badly’, Australasian Parliamentary Review, vol 20, no 2, 2005, pp 
130-43.
48 C Milne, ‘Long Live Minority Government: All Party Forum Delivers Many Gains’, 
Daily Planet, no 42, May-June 1996, p 6.
49 F Madill, ‘Love and Hate Under the Hare–Clark’, Legislative Studies, vol 11, no 2, 
1997, pp 68-74.
50 K Crowley, ‘Strained Relations: Governing in Minority in Tasmania’, Australasian 
Parliamentary Review, vol 17, no 2, Spring 2003, pp 55-71.
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date back at least to the early days of the Gray Liberal government, 
although not necessarily because it saw any threat from the emergence 
of the parliamentary Greens. There has long been a public perception 
of Tasmania as over-governed, and Gray responded by commissioning a 
committee of inquiry, with the Ogilvie report delivered in 1984.51 This 
report recommended no change to the status quo. A further inquiry was 
instigated by the Groom Liberal government52 under public pressure to 
justify 40 per cent pay rises for politicians, and produced the 1994 Morling 
report, which again recommended no change.53 Nevertheless, this report 
did suggest that, if change were politically imperative, then the reduction 
should be a democratic one, and from 54 to 44 total members, keeping 
the Hare-Clark system intact in the House of Assembly.54 The Legislative 
Council blocked this plan, even though the Groom government had 
unlinked it from politicians’ pay raises. But this plan was, nevertheless, the 
proposal that the Rundle Liberal government initially ran with, unsuccess-
fully as it turned out, when subsequently in a minority government alliance 
with the Greens.55
The failed parliamentary reform push by the Groom and Rundle 
governments, and thus the failure to justify the 40 per cent parliamen-
tary pay rises that were awarded, played into Labor’s hands as a means 
of rebuilding its shattered constituency. Added to this, the inevitable 
failure of the Liberal-Green alliance over core policy issues and directions 
was on the horizon, building the chances of Labor’s return to majority 
government. It was up to Labor to exploit these circumstances if it was to 
51 AG Ogilvie, G Foot and G Cartland, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Proposed 
Reduction in Numbers of Members Elected to Both Houses of the Tasmanian Parliament, 
Hobart, Parliament of Tasmania, 1984.
52 FR Groom (Premier, Chairman of Committee), Reform of Parliament: House of Assembly 
Select Committee Terms of Reference, Hobart, 1993.
53 T Morling, RJK Chapman, BR Archer and BK Miller, Report of the Board of Inquiry 
into the Size and Constitution of the Tasmanian Parliament, Hobart, 1994.
54 The composition was then thirty-five House of Assembly members elected from 
five seven-member electorates and nineteen Members of the Legislative Council (total 
fifty-four). The change suggested by the Morling Report was for twenty-eight House of 
Assembly members elected from four seven-member electorates and sixteen Members of 
the Legislative Council (total forty-four). The proposal eventually adopted was Labor’s five 
five-member electorates and fifteen Members of the Legislative Council (total forty). The 
four-by-seven model had received majority assent (Liberal-Green), but was amended to the 
five-by-five model by the Legislative Council, and then returned to, and eventually passed 
by, the House of Assembly; C Milne, Leader, Tasmanian Greens, 20 May 1999, personal 
communication.
55 Tasmanian Parliamentary Library, ‘Parliamentary Reform: Downsizing Parliament’, 
Parliamentary Fact Sheet Series, Tasmanian Parliamentary Library, Hobart, 1998, http:/
www.parliament.tas.gov.au/tpl/reform.htm (accessed November 2008).
151against green minority government?
return to majority power. At the 1996 election it had traded upon both 
issues with its slogans ‘40 per cent Never Forget’ and ‘No Deals with 
the Greens’, and during the Liberal-Green alliance it produced a reform 
proposal that would have the effect of reducing green parliamentari-
ans.56 Premier Rundle declared that this scheme was all about stamping 
out the Hare-Clark system and removing minority representation from 
Tasmania’s House of Assembly. But unable to achieve his own preferred 
reform model that was little threat to the Greens, and blocked by Labor 
from financing his budget program, Premier Rundle went to the polls in 
frustration two years before time, having first adopted Labor’s parliamen-
tary reform plan. This cut seats (from 35 to 25) and raised the electoral 
quota (from 12.5 per cent to 16.7 per cent) sufficient to minimise the 
election of any greens or independents.57 Having failed to reintegrate or 
woo back the green vote, Labor’s success with its reform scheme thus 
threatened to exclude Greens from parliament. As this paper has shown, 
the opposite has occurred over the last decade. However, the Greens did 
suffer the immediate effects of reform, even though they were the only 
party to have opposed the 40 per cent pay rise, consistently voting against 
it. They used the extra money to employ support staff that had been 
always denied them as a third party.58
Labor was returned to majority government at the 1998 election, 
the beneficiary of both the failed Liberal-Green alliance and of parlia-
mentary reform. Parliamentary reform has also helped return it to 
electoral dominance, with Labor holding power now for over a decade. 
The Liberals suffered a loss of support in 1998, following their failed 
minority government, to a new low of 38 per cent; not quite Labor’s low 
of 28 per cent following the Labor-Green Accord’s failure. The effect on 
the Greens was achieved as intended by the major parties in their reform 
bid to avert future Green supported minority governments. Whilst the 
Green vote dropped by only 1 per cent in 1998, to 10 per cent, the 
higher electoral quota saw Green parliamentary representation drop from 
four members to one. Subsequently, the Green vote has returned to more 
solid showings at the last two elections of 18 per cent (200259) and 16 per 
cent (200660), sufficient to return their representation to four members. 
56 TJ McCall, ‘Political Chronicles – Tasmania: January to June 1998’, Australian Journal 
of Politics and History, vol 44, no 4, 1998b, p 610.
57 Herr, ‘Reducing Parliament and Minority Government’, pp 130-43. As noted above 
the Legislative Council was also cut from nineteen to fifteen members.
58 L Armstrong, Good God, He’s Green: A History of Tasmanian Politics 1989-1996, Sydney, 
1997. This funding was eventually supplied by the Bacon Labor government.
59 K Crowley, ‘Strained Relations’, pp 55-71.
60 K Crowley, ‘The Place of Nature? Electoral Politics and the Tasmanian Greens’, People 
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If the effect of parliamentary reform was to reduce Green members, then 
this was short-lived; and neither has ‘environment’ proved an electoral 
fad as Labor had been hoping since the Accord’s failure. The major 
parties are now themselves suffering from the parliamentary reform, 
with the Liberal opposition too diminished to cover shadow portfolios 
effectively or to aspire to majority government in the short term, and 
Labor with virtually no back bench and overly reliant on advisers to assist 
with ministerial responsibilities. Parliamentary reform is now recognised 
as a ‘politically cynical’, ‘self interested’ attempt to prevent Greens from 
being elected that has diminished parliamentary performance and led 
to the need for an ethics commission to hold a less able government to 
greater account.61
Conclusion
This paper has found that the Labor Party and Labor government has felt 
the most adverse electoral impact from the emergence of the Tasmanian 
parliamentary Greens but that it has failed to reintegrate the green vote 
by greening up Labor. It has found that Labor’s struggle to return to 
power in its own right has been a key factor that has worked against 
the success of Green minority government. Rather than improve its own 
environmental credentials, Labor has instead resisted green agendas, 
destabilised governing arrangements with green partners, and achieved 
parliamentary reform aimed at reducing the number of Green parliamen-
tarians. As we have seen, this resistance helped achieve the failure of the 
green supported Labor minority government in 1992, and encouraged 
the frustrated abandonment of the Green supported Liberal minority 
government in 1998. It can be concluded therefore that Labor’s desire for 
electoral dominance is a key threat to the stability, longevity and policy 
productivity of Green supported minority government in Tasmania. 
Consequently, although it could be argued that there were no significant 
environmental outcomes from the Green-Liberal alliance, this paper 
found that it was a relatively more comfortable arrangement than the 
Green-Labor Accord. The question remains, however, as to why Labor 
has resisted an internal greening and remains so wedded to a conservative 
politics of environmental exploitation, forestry in particular, that ensures 
the ongoing electoral presence of green politics.
and Place, vol 16, no 2, 2008, pp 12-21.
61 S Neales, ‘A Shrunken Concern’, Mercury, 5 July 2008, p 33; W Crawford, ‘More MPs, 
Better Checks’, Mercury, 23 September 2008, p 25.
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